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Abstract 
Unilateral tariff liberalisation by developing nations is pervasive but our understanding of it 
is shallow. This paper strives to partly redress this lacuna on the theory side by introducing 
three novel political economy mechanisms with particular emphasis is on the role of 
production unbundling. One mechanism studies how lowering frictional barriers to imported 
parts can destroy the correlation of interests between parts producers and their downstream 
customers. A second mechanism studies how Kojima’s pro-trade FDI raises the political 
economy cost of maintaining high upstream barriers. The third works via a general 
equilibrium channel whereby developing country’s participation in the supply chains of 
advanced-nation industries undermines their own competitiveness in final goods, thus making 
final good protection more politically costly. In essence, developing nations’ pursuit of the 
export-processing industrialisation undermines their infant-industry industrialisation 
strategies. 
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1 This paper was written for a special issue of The International Economy (the journal of the Japan Society of 
International Economics) in tribute to the late Professor Kiyoshi Kojima. As a great admirer of Professor 
Kojima’s work and wisdom, I was honoured to be asked to help commemorate his life’s work with this 
contribution. I would like to thank Caroline Freund, Paola Conconi, Bernard Hoekman, Pierre-Louis Vezina, 
Yose Damui, Emanuel Ornelas, an anonymous referee, and Special Issue editor Professor Ruyhei Wakasugi for 
helpful comments and suggestions that greatly improved the paper. 1 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Trade liberalization for much of the second half of the 20
th century was difficult (Zeiler 1997). 
It was slow, it involved only rich nations, and it occurred only in the context of reciprocal 
bargains – both GATT Rounds and Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs).The reciprocity was 
critical; foreign tariffs fall only if domestic tariffs do, so mercantilists lobby against 
protectionists in their own nation. As such, governments found it politically optimal to cut 
tariffs in reciprocal bargains that they had previously found optimal to impose (Moser 1990).  
In the late 1980s, this situation changed. Many nations that had previously eschewed all 
forms of liberalization began to cut their tariffs autonomously. The World Bank, for instance, 
estimates that developing nations unilaterally lowered their average tariffs by something like 
14 percentage points between 1983 and 2003 independently of GATT/WTO rounds and 
RTAs (Martin and Ng 2004). The evolution of these tariff cuts is illustrated in Figure 1. 
While some nations lowered their tariffs starting in mid 1980s, most did the bulk of their 
tariff cutting in the mid to late 1990s.  
The picture is broadly similar for developing nations in East Asia and Latin America, but the 
more dramatic Figure 2). Tariffs in Latin America were quite high in the mid-1980s. 
Averages were all over 20% and many over 40%. All of these tariffs, however, plummeted 
starting in the late 1980s. Most of the national averages are now down around 10%. The story 
in East Asia is more mixed. Some – such as Singapore and Hong Kong – have long 
maintained low applied MFN tariffs, and even the more protectionist nations in the region 
had tariff averages in the five to fifteen percent range. In the late 1980s for most and early 
1990s for others, tariffs started to come down. By the turn of the century, average tariffs in 




Figure 1: Evolution of average tariff rates in developing nations. 
 
Source: Martin and Ng (2004). Notes: Average developing nation tariffs (three year moving average). 
Figure 2: Unilateral tariff cuts in Latin American and East Asia. 
 
Source: Inter-American Development Bank database and ITC database. 
The rise of unilateralism occurred at approximately the same time as the internationalisation 
of supply chains accelerated (Kimura et al 2007, Campa and Goldberg 1997, Hanson and 
Feenstra 1997). Specifically, the bundling of most stages of manufacturing within a single 
factory within a single nation came undone and some stages were moved offshore either 
inside or outside the boundaries of the original manufacturing firm. One very obvious version 












































































































































































































































































































































trade (Ishii and Yi 1997); intermediate inputs are imported and used in goods that are 
subsequently exported. Figure 3 shows that this trade was long important in Europe and 
North America but that it boomed in the late 1980s, especially in Asia.  
Figure 3: Outward processing trade, 1967 – 2005. 
 
Source: Amador and Cabral (2008).  
Internationalisation of the supply chain – also known as production unbundling, 
fragmentation, trade in tasks, or the second unbundling – is a much broader phenomenon than 
outward processing trade. Hanson and Feenstra (1997) document production unbundling 
across the US-Mexico border, and Ando and Kimura (2005) do the same for intra-East Asian 
trade. The densification of this production unbundling can be seen in Table 1, which shows 
the international input-output sector for East Asian nations’ manufacturing sectors. In 1985, 
Japan was an important supplier of inputs to all other East Asian nations but intermediates 
trade among the developing Asian nations was slender (apart from Singapore which was 
already a hub of microelectronics production). By 2000, however, the input-output matrix 
was much fuller with import supply links among nations such as China, Malaysia and 
Thailand.  
Another important – and easily measured – facet of supply-chain internationalisation is 
foreign direct investment. This also flourished at approximately the same time, namely the 
mid-1980s and early 1990s. Figure 4 illustrates the case of Japanese auto and electrical 
machinery plants placed in East Asian nations. The evolution shows a clear acceleration from 

















































Table 1: Widening and deepening of Factory Asia, 1985 and 2000.  
China  1985  Indonesia  Malaysia  Philippines  Thailand  Singapore  Taiwan  Korea  Japan 
Indonesia                 8%          
Malaysia                 16%          
Philippines                           
Thailand                           
China           2%     14%          
Taiwan                 3%          
Korea                            
Singapore     3%  7%                   
Japan  3%  12%  14%  4%  9%  12%  7%  8%    
RoW     15%  19%  19%  14%  11%  10%  16%  8% 
China  2000  Indonesia  Malaysia  Philippines  Thailand  Singapore  Taiwan  Korea  Japan 
 Indonesia                  2%          
 Malaysia            3%  4%  12%  2%       
 Philippines                             
 Thailand         4%  3%     3%          
 China      2%  3%     4%  5%  2%       
 Taiwan         5%  5%  3%  3%          
 Korea   2%  3%  4%  8%  3%  4%  4%       
 Singapore         13%  6%  4%             
 Japan   2%  7%  15%  20%  16%  19%  14%  7%    
 RoW   4%  16%  20%  20%  17%  38%  15%  11%  4% 
Notes: Share of manufactured inputs bought by column nation’s manufacturing sector from the row nation; 
numbers less than 2% are zeroed out; own-nation purchases are also zeroed out. The columns would sum to 
100% if each nation’s own supply of inputs to its own manufactured sector were included and all entries below 
2% had not been zeroed. RoW equals Rest of World. IDE-JETRO is the source of the Asian input-output matrix 
(7 sectors) for 1985 and 2000; see Inomata, Satoshi and Yoko Uchida (2009) for background. 
Source: Baldwin (2006b). 
 
The underlying causes of this new, more complex form of international commerce are not 
fully understood. I have elsewhere argued that the key was the revolution in information and 
communication technologies (ICT) that occurred in the 1980s (telecoms) and 1990s (internet) 
– see Figure 5.
2
Figure 4: Number of Japanese auto and electrical machinery plants in East Asia, 1975 – 
2004. 
  
                                                 
2 See Baldwin (2006a) for details and policy implications. See Ariu and Mion (2010) for evidence on the link 
between ICT and offshoring. 5 
 
 
Source: Fujita and Hamaguchi (2006).  
Figure 5: ICT revolution indicators 
 
Sources: World Bank, Doing Business database, and www.isc.org/solutions/survey/history.  
The assertion is that the initial clustering of manufacturing stages was not due to 
transportation costs but rather what might be called ‘coordination costs’. The initial bundling 
of manufacturing stages stemmed from the way that the costs of coordinating complex 
processes are reduced by physical proximity. This distinction between transportation and 
coordination costs is relevant since there is little evidence that the world experienced a sharp 
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As some of these coordination costs are related to communications, the ICT revolution 
fundamentally changed the balance between agglomeration and dispersion of manufacturing 
stages (Baldwin and Venables 2010). Coordination at distance became cheaper and more 
reliable and this made it economically feasible to offshore some manufacturing stages 
without hindering the overall functioning of the supply chain. As the factor intensity of 
manufacturing stages can vary greatly within a single production process, and factor prices 
variable greatly across nations, trade in parts and components flourished as rich-country 
manufacturers offshored labour-intensive stages to emerging economies. Foreign direct 
investment and other more subtle forms of cross-border corporate control also boomed.  
This paper is an effort to understand the political economy of unilateral liberalization and -- 
in particular -- its association with the ICT revolution and production unbundling; plainly this 
cannot account for all the unilateralism and the stories work best for trade among the 
members of what has been called ‘Factory Asia’, and by extension trade among the members 
of Factory North America, and Factory Europe.  The paper presents three novel mechanisms 
that can account for unilateral liberalisation of tariffs that occurs in tandem with production 
unbundling.  
Each mechanism tackles the “liberalisation paradox” directly. As Baldwin and Baldwin 
(1996) note, tariff liberalisation is something of a paradox. Assuming policy choices are 
endogenous, the initial tariff must have been optimal, so why would removing the tariff also 
be optimal? Any complete model unilateralism thus requires three elements: an explanation 
of why protection was politically optimal in the first place, a shock that changes the political 
and/or economic setting, and an explanation of why the shock makes a lower tariff politically 
optimal. Arguing that governments removed tariffs because they finally understood that free 
trade was in their nation’s own best interest is insufficient as one then must then explain why 
governments failed to understand this previously. The rest of the introduction provides a 
verbal description of the three economic logics.  
Unilateral liberalisation and Kojima’s pro-trade FDI 
The first mechanism assumes the (developing country) government is a ‘development state’, 
i.e. interested in industrialisation per se. If the weight the government applies to 
industrialisation versus general welfare is high enough, the initial situation is one of high 
tariff barriers on final manufactured goods as well as their parts and components – i.e. a 
policy of infant industry protection. This starting point is meant to represent the 1960s and 7 
 
1970s when most developing nations pursed import substitution policies and most industries 
in developed nations were clustered spatially – often in a particular city or region.  
From the perspective of developing nations – especially those geographically close to 
industrial powerhouse nations like Japan, the US and Germany – this opened a new pathway 
to industrialisation. Rather than developing domestic capacities over a span of decades (as 
was done in the US, Germany, Japan, Korea and others) offshoring allowed nations like 
Thailand and the Philippines to set up sophisticated manufacturing facilities in a matter of 
months, or years.  
In the model, this new form of industrialisation changes the political economy problem facing 
the developing nation government. The shock is that the ‘pro-trade FDI’ shifts the developing 
nation’s comparative advantage; the nation switches from being an importer (or potential 
importer if tariffs were prohibitive) to being an exporter of the product concerned – be it a 
part, component, or final good. In addition to directly rendering import tariffs on the newly 
exported good useless, the new production shifts the government’s view on upstream tariffs. 
Protection of upstream inputs always harms downstream production, but the newly 
established factory expands the marginal cost of any given upstream tariff. Thus whatever the 
optimal tariff was on parts before the offshoring, it becomes lower in response to the pro-
trade FDI. In this way, pro-trade FDI fosters unilateral liberalisation by developing nations. A 
slight twist on this – so-called race-to-the-bottom unilateralism – considers the possibility that 
the multinational establishing the new factory may have a variety of location choices and so 
may bargain for a zero tariff on upstream inputs.
3
One reaction to this change could be more nuanced than a lowering of the MFN applied tariff. 
Governments could – and many did – set up export processing zones where tariffs in 
imported parts were zero or subject to a duty drawback scheme that had the same effect. This 
would allow the nation to both exploit the new industrialisation opportunities offered by pro-
trade FDI while simultaneously maintaining high infant-industry tariffs for production 
destined for the domestic market. We return to this point in the third mechanism.  
  
Infant industry protection and production unbundling 
                                                 
3 Baldwin (2006b) informally sketches the logic Vezina (2010) presents empirical that the mechanism was in 
action in East Asia. 8 
 
The second model of unilateral tariff liberalisation focuses on trade in parts and components 
per se – abstracting from offshore investment by high-technology nations. The developing 
country government in this model is assumed to be of the Grossman-Helpman “Protection for 
Sale” (PFS) type (Grossman and Helpman 1994).  
In this sort of political economy setting, a positive tariff on imported intermediates is 
politically optimal only if the protection somehow lowers the local cost of the intermediates. 
The point is that price-rising protection of upstream segments of the production chain is 
worse than a zero sum game when it comes to profits (and thus political contributions in the 
PFS set up). Given that the government cares about the sum of contributions and this is tied 
to the sum of profits, the optimal upstream tariff is zero (Cadot, de Melo and Olarreaga 2004).  
To explain the presence of high tariffs on parts and components as well as final goods, an 
economic model where protection may lower local prices is needed, i.e. where infant-industry 
protection makes economic sense. Parts production, it is assumed, is subject to economies of 
scale; local production is only economic if it takes place on a sufficiently large scale. This 
creates multiple equilibria and the easiest way to model it is to assume external economies of 
scale. Without a sufficiently high tariff on parts, there would be little domestic parts 
production and marginal production costs would be high forcing domestic final goods 
producers to import parts. Even if imported parts are cheaper in foreign nations (FOB), it is 
assumed that frictional barriers (coordination, communication, etc.) make importing parts 
very costly for developing nation final good producers. In this situation, a tariff on parts can 
stimulate domestic production and thus actually lower the domestic costs of parts (as local 
production avoids the frictional barriers). In this setting, lobbying for a tariff on parts is 
lobbying for lower priced parts, not higher priced parts. For this reason, final goods producers 
and parts producers find their interests aligned; high tariffs on both are politically optimal.
4
As our goal is to explain historical policy choices, we only need that the government and 
final good producers believe that protection of parts will lower costs. Here it is worth noting 
that the efficacy of infant-industry protection was a mainstream belief in the 1950s and 1960s, 
even if such faith is rare in the modern world. In the early days of the post-war trade system, 
 
                                                 
4 The simple model in this paper focuses on one set of assumptions that generates infant-industry protection, but 
there are many more. For example there are several new economic geography models where protection lowers 
domestic prices by fostering an industrial cluster that would not have otherwise existed (Venables, 1985, 1987). 9 
 
the merits of industry-creating protection were regarded as clear cut. For example, the 1958 
Haberler Commission – which examined the problems of developing nations in the world 
trade system – summarises the pervasive belief in the need for and effectiveness of infant 
industry protection. We can see this belief in a contemporary review of the Report published 
in the Quarterly Journal of Economics. “Referring to the underdeveloped countries in a 
general way, the authors recognize that, in their case, special considerations justify a rather 
greater use of trade controls and of protection than in the highly industrialized countries. Few 
economists will disagree with this view.” (Richter 1959).
5
Taking this economic model as given, the initial political equilibrium features high tariffs on 
both upstream and downstream goods. The trigger for unilateral tariff liberalisation is a drop 
in the frictional trade costs due to the ICT revolution. When these costs fall enough to make 
imported parts cheaper than locally made parts the correlation of interests between final and 
parts producers breaks down. When it does, full liberalisation of parts is the PFS equilibrium, 
at least if both parts and final goods makers are organised.  
  
The death of infant-industry industrialisation strategies 
As mentioned, pro-trade FDI need not result in the removal of infant industry tariffs directly 
if they government can segment imports between domestic-oriented production and export-
oriented production. The third mechanism introduced in this paper combines the first two in a 
way that explains the demise of government’s faith in infant industry protection. The basic 
story is simple.  
In the 1960s and 1970s, many developing nations (especially in East Asia) pursued dual track 
industrialisation strategies (Ando and Kimura 2005). The first track was import substitution 
that encouraged the development of the full supply chain behind tariff barriers. The second 
track was to encourage export processing activities where the nation’s low-cost labour was 
used by multinational corporations to lower the cost of their components. As the production 
unbundling proceeded and the offshoring of segments of the value added chain spread, the 
                                                 
5 The authors comprised three of the most eminent trade economists of the time – Gottfried Haberler, James 
Meade and Jan Tinbergen – and that it was commissioned by GATT members which included all the major 
Western powers and many developing nations. The Report’s conclusions provided important intellectual 
underpinnings for the rather general exceptions that developing nations were granted in the GATT (Title IV) to 
refrain from making reciprocal tariff cuts in GATT Rounds. 10 
 
relative competitiveness of infant-industry goods was undermined. In essence, developing 
nations’ participation in international supply chains undermined their own competitiveness in 
final goods.  
To put it differently, observe that before unbundling, manufacturing involved a collection of 
labour intensive stages and knowledge intensive stages. This bundling tended to mute 
comparative advantages. Competitiveness of the, say, Japanese carmakers was hindered by 
the fact that labour-intensive stages had to be done by high-wage Japanese. When production 
unbundling became possible, the cost of the Japanese production fell since offshoring 
allowed Japan to borrow elements of developing nation’s comparative advantage in labour-
intensive activities. Importantly, this was not mutual. The developing nation automakers did 
not enjoy a corresponding ‘borrowing’ of the Japan’s comparative advantage in knowledge-
intensive stages. The net result is that production unbundling heightens the rich nation’s 
comparative advantage in cars as its costs fall but the developing country carmaker’s costs 
did not.  
As far as the mechanism is concerned, the key point is that the shift in competitiveness 
tended to raise the political economy cost of infant-industry protection in two ways. First, by 
lowering the world price of cars, offshoring raised the domestic welfare costs of any given 
level of final good production. The politically optimal response would be some lowering of 
final good protection. Second, if developing country car marker hoped to maintain their 
competitiveness, they would have to purchase components from the lowest cost source rather 
than favouring local parts makers created by infant-industry policies. This increases political 
pressure to reduce tariffs on parts and components. To put it differently, maintaining the same 
rate of effective protection in the face of offshoring-induced drops in final-good prices would 
require a reduction in upstream tariffs. As this process proceeds, maintenance of the same 
level of effective protection leads to a progressive hollowing out the infant-industry cluster, 
starting for the beginning of the supply chain and working down towards the final good. In 
the extreme, the only thing that ‘infant industry’ protection can salvage is the assembling of 
‘knock-down kits’ (i.e. imported kits that contain all the necessary parts and components to 
make the final automobile). At this point, faith in the eventual maturation of the infant may 
be fatally eroded with the result that the nation decides to turn itself into one big export 
processing zone and jettison its infant-industry track.  11 
 
1.1.  Plan of the paper 
As it turns out, the particular modelling choices for the three mechanisms make it more 
convenient to address the second mechanism first, followed by the first and then the third. 
Before turning the new theory, the next section, Section 2, extensively reviews the existing 
literature as a to situate this paper’s contribution into the ongoing effort to understand the 
political economy of unilateral tariff liberalisation. After that Section 3 introduces basic 
issues by working through a protection-for-sale (PFS) political economy model in the 
presence of a simple supply chain. Section 4 presents the two basic models, and the 
subsequent section discusses a number of obvious extension and combinations of the two that 
may account for various aspects of the observed liberalisation. The penultimate section 
sketches out a model of the ‘death of dual track development’ and the final section present 
some concluding remarks.  
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
The political economy logic of reciprocal liberalisation is well understood. As Cooper (1971 
p.410) puts it: “The principle of reciprocity is designed to hold out the promise of export 
gains to certain sectors of the economy, and thereby to establish a counterweight to those who 
will be hurt by increased imports. Reciprocity attempts to build pluralistic support for tariff 
reduction.”
 6Reciprocity, in short, harnesses mercantilists in each nation to the task of 
lobbying against their own protectionists – a political economy realignment that means 
governments find it political optimal to negotiate down tariffs they previously found optimal 
to put up. Liberalisation continue due a ‘juggernaut effect’ whereby tariff cuts strengthen 
exporters and weaken import competitors in all nations. After a few years of industrial 
adjustment, governments once again find it optimal to bargain down tariffs they previous 
found optimal to preserve in earlier rounds.
7
                                                 
6 Well known to trade negotiators, this point was surely not novel to Cooper and many have made it 
subsequently including Roesseler (1978), Blackhurst (1979), and Baldwin (1980). For an early formal treatment 
see Moser (1990), or Hillman and Moser (1992); the political economy logic in these early papers was brought 
to the attention of the broad community of trade scholars via the parameterisation introduced by Grossman and 
Helpman (1995).  
 This accounts for the GATT’s success, but not 
7 The juggernaut effect, i.e. the idea that initial tariff cuts trigger a second round of cuts after industrial 
adjustment, is due to Baldwin (1994 p. 73); Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2008) provide a mathematical 
treatment. Baldwin (2010) uses the framework to structure the historical narrative of the GATT’s 50 years of 12 
 
unilateralism; reciprocity played no direct role in developing nations’ autonomous tariff 
cutting.  
Given the pervasiveness of unilateralism, and the fact that has been going on since the mid 
1980s, there is remarkably little theoretical literature exploring the political economy of 
unilateral trade liberalization. In the economics literature, most discussions of unilateralism 
consist of practical accounts of how and why various nations undertook such measures (e.g. 
Garnaut 1991, Young 1996, Edwards and Lederman 1998, Richardson 2001, and Sally 2008). 
The political economy theories that account for unilateralism include Coates and Ludema 
(2001), Krishna and Mitra (2008), and very recently Ludema, Mayda and Mishra (2010), and 
Conconi and Perroni (2010). Ethier (2002) presents a model of unilateral protection (so-
called aggressive unilateralism) but his model does not work in reverse to explain unilateral 
tariff cutting. 
Coates and Ludema (2001) work in the tradition that borrows industrial organisation models 
of collusion between firms, relabeling the firms as nations, and cooperative price-setting as 
cooperative tariff-setting (see Dixit 1987 for an early example). Coates and Ludema (2001) 
borrow a set-up akin to the Porter and Green (1984) model of collusion with imperfect 
monitoring and uncertain demand where an unobservable shock may disturb what would 
otherwise be a standard dynamic game of collusion. Coates and Ludema (2001) assume that 
two nations sign a reciprocal tariff-cutting agreement, but its ratification in one nation is 
unsure in the short-run – although it is 100% certain in the long run. Using a repeated game 
set-up, they show that the partner nation might unilaterally implement its side of the 
reciprocal agreement in the first period, even if the other nation fails to ratify the agreement 
right away. 
There are two difficulties in using Coates and Ludema (2001) to structure our thinking about 
the late 1980s and 1990s unilateralism. First their model is about not really about 
unilateralism; it is about temporary unilateral implementation of a reciprocal trade agreement. 
Second, their model works in the ‘self-enforcing’ trade agreement tradition which is marred 
by a fatal flaw when applied to tariff liberalisation.
8
                                                                                                                                                        
tariff cutting success. Empirical support can be found in Fugazza and Robert-Nicoud (2010).  
  
8 The self-enforcing liberalisation model was first explained in modern terms by Dixit (1987) and Jensen and 
Thursby (1984); Bagwell and Staiger (1990) extended the model and brought it to the attention of the broad 13 
 
The flaw shows up even in the simplest self-enforcing model. Define W
c, W
n, and W
d as a 
nation’s welfare when, respectively, the trade agreement is implemented (‘c’ being a 
mnemonic for cooperation), when all play is non-cooperative (‘n’ for Nash), and when the 
nation in question unilaterally deviates from the cooperative equilibrium (‘d’ for deviation). 




Cooperation is sustained by the threat of a permanent revision to W
n the period after 
deviation is observed. Formally, the present value of cooperating forever, and of playing 
Nash forever after any deviation are, respectively, W
c/(1-δ) and δW
c/(1-δ), where δ equals 
1/(1+ρ) and ρ is the discount rate. Price collusion in an industrial organisation model, and 




n. The maximum sustainable cooperation can be measured by W
c-W
n.  
For any given annual discount rate, say 5%, the key to this condition is the length of the 
period in which deviation can occur without retaliation. If a nation can maintain the high, 
deviation-tariff while others keep theirs at the cooperative level for, say a year, δ is about 
0.95; if the deviation is detected and punished quickly, say after one day, then δ is 0.999863. 
The maximum sustainable cooperation that can be explained by this approach – which is 
equal to (1-δ)(W
d-W
n) – limits to zero as the non-detection period shortens to zero.  
In industrial organisation models, this is not a problem since collusion involves prices (or 
quantities) that are hard to observe; prices are often in private contracts struck between one 
producer and her customers, neither of which has an incentive to reveal the information to the 
other producers. By contrast, this is fatal flaw when applied to tariffs as the non-detection 
period is a matter of hours.
9
                                                                                                                                                        
community of trade scholars. 
 Foreign companies who pay the deviation-tariff know about it 
immediately and have an incentive to report it to their own government who can then 
implement the punishment strategy at the stroke of a pen. Thus δ essentially equals unity in 
tariff games. This means that self-enforcing tariff agreement models – such as Coates and 
9 For example, the surprise announcement of a 10% US tariff hike on 15 August 1971 was 
made on national television by President Nixon; the nightly news coverage a few hours later 
included the reaction of European and Japanese policy makers. The deviation was detected 
even before the deviation tariff was applied.  
 14 
 
Ludema (2001) – cannot account for tariff cooperation, i.e. (1-δ)(W
d-W
n)=0. Cooperation 
does, of course, occur, but we need a different approach to explain it.  
Ludema, Mayda and Mishra (2010) develop a model whereby firms influence government’s 
tariff choices by transmitting information about the value of protection via cheap-talk 
messages and costly lobbying. They apply this to a particular form of temporary unilateralism 
in the US known as ‘tariff suspensions’. Their model does not help us understand the mass 
shift to unilateralism, as it fails to tackle the paradox of liberalisation. The model opens with 
an exogenously set tariff on an intermediate good and in the first period the government may 
decide to rescind the tariff. The heart of the model lies in the political competition between 
upstream and downstream firms, but if rescinding the tariff is politically optimal in period 
one, why was it in place in period zero?  
A much more promising mechanism is presented in Krishna and Mitra (2008). This paper 
presents an appealing account of the basic political economy forces behind unilateral tariff 
cutting, or more specifically of ‘reciprocated unilateralism’ whereby a unilateral tariff 
liberalisation by one nation triggers unilateral tariff liberalisation in another. When both 
nations’ trade policies are determined endogenously, multiple equilibriums arise; either both 
liberalise or neither do. The basic logic can be thought of as picking up half way through the 
juggernaut effect; instead of trade talks triggering a reciprocal tariff cut that then induces 
industrial restructuring which in turn sets the scene for further tariff cutting, this model starts 
the juggernaut rolling with an autonomous foreign tariff cut.  
In the Krishna-Mitra model, a nation’s tariff is the outcome of a domestic struggle between 
pro-unilateral-liberalisation interests in the export sector (they want to lower the cost of 
imports) and anti-unilateral-liberalisation interests in the import-competing sector. If a 
nation’s trade partner removes its tariffs unilaterally, the additional foreign market access 
shifts economic resources from the pro-tariff group to the anti-tariff group. As political power 
is linked to a sector’s economic size, the result is unilateral liberalisation of a type that might 
be called ‘contagious’ unilateralism.  
This insightful logic is very appealing and almost surely plays an important role in 
understanding some aspects of the observed unilateral tariff cutting. For example, it explains 
how shifted political power among domestic special interest groups can make low-tariffs self-
enforcing without relying on the flawed self-enforcement approach discussed above.  15 
 
There are, however, a couple of difficulties in using this analytic framework to understand the 
facts discussed above. The first could easily be remedied. Krishna and Mitra (2008) do not 
directly tackle the liberalisation paradox, but it is easy to imagine an extension which it did. 
Their foreign nation could be taken as the collection of advanced nations whose tariffs were 
liberalised by a juggernaut mechanism in GATT rounds.  The foreign unilateralism in 
Krishna-Mitra could then be taken as the MFN extension of GATT Round tariffs cuts to 
developing nations.  
The second is more serious as it concerns timing of the unilateralism. The rich nations – 
whose markets are the main destination for developing nation exports – lowered their tariffs 
progressively from 1948, with major steps in the 1950s, 1960s (Kennedy Round), and 1970s 
(Tokyo Round), and 1990s (Uruguay Round); see Figure 6 for the facts for the US, which are 
broadly in line with those of the EU and Japan (imports of these three accounted for over 
70% of world imports up to 1995).  
Presuming that Krishna and Mitra (2008) have this GATT-driven liberalisation by rich 
nations in mind, the fact that the timing of the unilateral cuts in developing nations does not 
match the timing of the rich nations’ cuts is a problem. The general point is clear in the 
comparison of Figure 1 and Figure 6, and even clearer in the charts for Latin America and 
East Asia in Figure 2. The major MFN tariff cutting in the advanced economies occurred in 
the late 1960s and 1970s.  As the developing nation unilateralism started a decade later, it is 
somewhat strained to view rich-nation tariff cutting in the GATT Rounds as the main trigger 
of developing-nation unilateralism.  
Another line of reasoning that surely is part of the complete story of global unilateralism 
concerns ‘spillover’ effects from reciprocal liberalisation. Two economic mechanisms have 
been highlighted in the literature that link preferential liberalisation done in reciprocal RTAs 
to unilateral MFN liberalisation. The first links RTAs to unilateral MFN liberalisation. The 
second looks at how a RTA can lower or raise a nation’s ‘effective’ MFN tariff rate. 
 
Figure 6: US tariff reductions, 1948 to 2005. 16 
 
 
Source: Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, www.census.gov 
The first approach was motivated by the Latin American experience where regional tariff 
cutting was accompanied by unilateral MFN tariff cutting. As Figure 7 shows, the time path 
of reciprocal tariff cutting in the many Latin American RTAs bears a striking resemblance to 
the time path of Latin American MFN unilateralism shown in Figure 2. The question that 
structures this literature is: What is the impact of an RTA on a nation’s unilaterally optimal 
MFN tariff? Intuitively, the answer turns on whether preferential tariffs are “political” 
complements or substitutes for MFN tariffs.   
The easiest way to organise the various mechanisms in this literature is to start from Meade’s 
formula for the welfare impact of any trade policy change in a Walrasian economy, namely 
TdM minus Mdp* where T is the specific tariff vector, M is the bilateral import matrix, and 
p* is the border price vector (see Baldwin and Venables 1995). A nation choosing its bilateral 
tariffs optimally would view this as a first order condition and set it to zero to find its optimal 







M T = , where the destination nation ‘d’ imposes the tariff Tod on goods from 
origin nation ‘o’.  
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Source: Inter American Development Bank.  
In general, anything can happen to Tod when the nation signs a free trade agreement since the 
direct and cross-good income and substitution effects of the FTA-induced price changes 
could raise or lower the right-hand side. This ambiguity has been resolved by several 
mechanisms in the literature. The first mechanism turns on the general principle that taxes 
become more distortionary when the cross-product variance of rates increases. As bilateral 
tariff cutting increases the variance of tariffs across suppliers, it increases inefficiency and 
creates an efficiency-based argument for reducing tariffs on third-nation imports, i.e. for 
unilateralism. Ornelas (2005a) makes the point very cleanly in a Brander-Krugman model of 
two-way trade with three nations.  
As second mechanism turns on the Mod term. RTA-induced price changes typically reduce 
trade with third nations (trade diversion). If the slope of the import supply curve from third 
nations is not increasing too fast, the reduction in Mod will bring down the optimal Tod for 
third nations, i.e. induce unilateralism. Richardson (1993) presents a related argument that 
focuses on tariff revenue losses. Ornelas (2005b, c) make a similar argument that links MFN 
unilateralism to the exogenous implementation of an RTA. As preferential tariff cutting 
typically undermines the import competing industry to some extent, it also undermines 
political demand for tariffs on third-nation imports. This induces the government to re-
optimise external tariffs in a downward direction. Other contributions in this line include 















































































































The big advantage to using this line of argument to understand the massive unilateralism of 
the 1980s and 1990s is that it fits the timing. The big drawback, however, is logical. These 
models do not answer the ‘liberalisation paradox’ but rather pushes it back one step. They do 
not explain why preferential tariff cutting became politically optimal when previously it was 
not.  
Conconi and Perroni (2010), a paper that was still in draft form when this article went to 
press, relies on a Krishna-Mitra-like mechanism to explain why unilateralism might be 
contagious. That is, foreign liberalisation shifts resources out of the import-competing sector 
in equilibrium and this makes it easier for the home government to sustain unilateral free 
trade. Specifically, Conconi and Perroni (2010) work with the asymmetric lobbying set-up of 
Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2002) where entry eliminates quasi-rents and thus all incentives 
to lobby whenever tariffs are constant over time. To this they add a credibility problem 
whereby the government has an incentive to raise the tariff by surprise as a means of 
temporarily creating quasi-rents in the import-competing sector. As the size of the temporary 
quasi-rents increases with the pre-surprise size of the import-competing sector, and this size 
is reduced by foreign tariff liberalisation (due to the Krishna-Mitra-like resources shift), 
foreign unilateral tariff liberalisation tends to make it easier for the home government to stick 
to a path of free trade. In this sense, unilateral liberalisation is contagious. However, foreign 
liberalisation also reduces the difference between the free-trade and the opportunistic-tariffs 
paths. Thus foreign liberalisation has an ambiguous impact on the sustainability of free trade.  
More specifically, the authors’ assumptions generate a standard time-inconsistency problem; 
the small-country government would like to commit to permanent free trade, but faces a 
temptation to announce such a policy and then renege. If the free-trade path is credible, free 
entry implies that there are no rents to lobby for (as per the Baldwin-Robert-Nicoud result) 
and thus no lobbying.
10
                                                 
10 See discussion of asymmetric lobbying in Grossman and Helpman (1996), and Baldwin (1993) for the 
original presentation of the idea. 
 This is why credible free trade is politically optimal (recall that the 
PFS objective function reverts to the social welfare function without lobbying). If the free 
trade path it is not credible, lobbying occurs on the margin so – even though there are no 
quasi-rent in equilibrium (free entry eliminates them) – the outcome is a positive, time-
invariant level of protection. As this is inferior to the free trade path, the government faces a 19 
 
classic a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. As noted above in the discussion of Coates-
Ludema paper, the ‘cooperative’ outcome (free trade in this application) is sustained if and 
only if the one-shot value of deviating is not too much higher than the non-cooperative 
outcome (permanent protection in this application).
11
There are three problems in using this political economy logic to understand real world 
unilateralism. First, the authors do not explore the class of parameterisations leading to the 
real-world outcome (i.e. nations embrace unilateral free trade) and they note that standard 
parameterisations (e.g. linear demand) leads to the rather un-useful result that foreign 
liberalisation has no impact on domestic liberalisation. Second, the paper does not confront 
the ‘liberalisation paradox’ directly, i.e. why nations that previously found it optimal to 
protect unilaterally now find it optimal to liberalise unilaterally. Third, even if the first two 
were fixed, the deep fundamentals of the Conconi-Perroni mechanism would be those of 
Krishna-Mitra and thus subject to the timing problem that rich nations liberalised a decade 
before developing nations.  
 In symbols, free trade can be 
unilaterally sustained when W
c exceeds (1-δ)W
d+δW
n. As foreign liberalisation reduces W
d 
but raises W
n, the net effect on free-trade sustainability is unclear.  
A final line of argumentation in the economics literature – one that is often viewed as 
explaining unilateralism in Africa and India – is the ‘conditionality approach’. This focuses 
on that fact that the IMF typically used their leverage during crisis-linked interventions to 
force nations to unilaterally cut tariffs. . The conditionality attached to extending loans 
frequently requires nations to reduce trade barriers (Stone 2004, Borgatti 2006). 
In the International Relations literature, the rise of democracy is often painted as a key driver. 
For example, Milner and Kubota (2005) argue that democratisation of the political system 
reduces the ability of governments to use trade barriers as a strategy for building political 
support.  
Discussion in the final section suggests how the new arguments in this paper could be 
combined with elements of the existing literature to provide an account of real world 
unilateralism.  
                                                 
11 Note that the zero-detection delay problem does not appear here as the basic periodicity is linked to the 
election cycle which is typically many years.  20 
 
3.  POLITICAL ECONOMY OF UNILATERAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION 
The three questions raised by the liberalisation paradox are: why protection was politically 
optimal to start with, what shock changed the economic and/or political setting, and how the 
shock produces the policy reversal. For most forms of trade liberalisation the first question is 
the easiest – typically some form of “Olson’s Asymmetry” explains why economically 
inefficient protection is chosen (Olson 1965); when protection’s winners are organised while 
its losers are not, politically motivated governments choose too much protection. When it 
comes to the unilateral liberalisation of parts and components, however, the first question is 
the hard part.  
As it turns out, using the standard parameterisation of Olson’s Asymmetry (Grossman and 
Helpman 1994), protection on parts and components should not happen – assuming that both 
final goods makers and parts makers are politically organised. The point is demonstrated 
explicitly below, but the basic result has been widely known since Cadot, de Melo and 
Olarreaga (2004). Tariffs that raise intermediate input prices shift profits from downstream to 
upstream firms; this is zero sum if there are no imports and no substitution, but less than zero 
sum if imports are positive. Profit-linked lobby contributions are thus maximised by setting 
intermediate tariffs to zero.  
In the next section, we introduce two modifications to the PFS approach that explains why 
protection of parts and components could be politically optimal in the first place. Before 
turning to the models, we introduce notation and fix ideas by demonstrating that the 
equilibrium tariff on parts is indeed zero in the simple PFS approach.  
3.1.  PFS with a domestic supply chain  
To illustrate the basic issues as simply as possible, we work with the standard assumptions of 
the simplified PFS model and add a stylized supply chain.
12
                                                 
12 The simplifications of the PFS model we exploit are explained in Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2006). 
  Specifically, we assume a small-
open, Ricardo-Viner economy with three sectors, the numeraire good A, the parts sector Y, 
and the final goods sector Z (Y and Z are chosen as mnemonics – Y comes before Z just as 
the production for upstream Y comes before the production downstream Z). There are three 
productive factors (labour and the Y and Z sector-specific capital). Perfect competition and 21 
 
constant returns is assumed for all sectors; A and Y are made from primary factors while Z is 
made from Y and primary factors.  
The per-capita indirect utility function is: 
  ∑ = +
n
i i i p s e
1 ] [   (1) 
where n is the number of non-numeraire sectors, the si is the sub-indirect utility functions for 
each non-numeraire sector, and ‘e’ is expenditure. Expenditure equals the sum of labour and 
capital income. 
The government’s objective function Ω is a weighted sum of social welfare W, and lobbying 
contributions, C: 
  ] [ i i j p C aW Λ ∈ Σ + = Ω   (2) 
where capital lambda, Λ, is the set of sectors that are organised politically (and thus can make 
political contributions) and Ci is the contribution of sector i. Each lobby’s contribution 
schedule is assumed to be ‘truthful’ – specifically it is sector operating profits minus a 
constant that is determined in equilibrium (this assumes that lobbyists ignore price effects 
beyond their own sector).  
We introduce the supply chain by assuming that each final good requires one part as an input 
in addition to labour.
13
                                                 
13 For analysis of more complex supply relationships, see Cadot, de Melo and Olarreaga (2004).  
 We have two nations, Home and Foreign, that compete in both parts 
(Y) and final goods (Z); but we start by taking Home to be “small”, i.e. it takes border prices 
as parametric. We assume that Home would be an importer of both parts and final goods 
under free trade, so protection of both sectors is a real issue. The Home nation has a 
comparative advantage in the numeraire (untaxed) good. This and the small open economy 
assumption pins down the Home wage rate; it must be such that the domestic price of the 
numeraire good exactly matches the exogenously given world price. Choosing units of the 
numeraire good, this result allows us to normalise the Home wage to unity (thus wage does 
not appear explicitly in cost or profit functions).  22 
 
3.1.1.  Free trade in final goods and parts 
We open the analysis by considering the outcome when all Home tariffs are zero. The left 
panel shows the supply and demand diagram in the parts market; SY is the supply curve and 
DY is the demand curve. Demand for Y is derived demand, i.e. it is based on the output of the 
domestic final sector given that each unit of final good Z requires one unit of Y.   
  
Figure 8: Trade in parts and final goods 
 
The right panel shows the market for the final good, Z; the demand curve for Z depends upon 
consumer optimization in the usual fashion; however the supply curve is linked to the price of 
parts, Y. Final-goods technology is such that there is a rising marginal cost of turning parts 
into final goods. This marginal cost curve is shown as MC in the right panel. The supply 
curve for Z – i.e. the full marginal cost curve – is MC plus the price of Y. That is why the Z 
supply curve, SZ, starts at PY where PY is the equilibrium price of parts and rises in line with 
MC (recall we assume one part is required per final good).  
With free trade, the price in the Y market is set by the world price P
w
Y and so the Home 
output of Y, QY, is not tied to QZ.  
The diagram shows the fundamental tension within the domestic supply chain. Any tariff on 

























as domestic Y production is independent of Z production, upstream Y producers have no 
interest in supporting downstream Z-sector production on the margin. In other words, there is 
no correlation of interest among sectors in the domestic supply chain. 
3.1.2.  Supply chains and tariffs: PFS approach 
The politically optimal tariffs solve the government’s two first order condition (i.e. for the Y 
and Z sectors). Taking account of the non-negativity constraint on tariffs, the government’s 
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Note that, for notational convenience, the choice is with respect to the domestic price rather 
than the tariff directly; the equilibrium tariff is backed out of the optimal domestic price using 
the exogenous world price. Here N is the mass of citizens, and ri and si are the per capita 
tariff revenue and consumer surplus functions, and πi is sector-i operating profit, i.e. the 
Ricardian surplus that is the reward to the sector specific capital.  
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where Mi, Di, and Qi are sector-i imports, demand, and domestic production respectively; 
dMi/dpi is the change in imports in response to a domestic price change. Using these 
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The first expression says that the politically optimal tZ is positive. That is, as the first term is 
negative (due to dMi/dpi<0) and the second term is positive (as Qz>0), tz must be positive for 
the sum to be zero. The second expression says that the equilibrium ty is zero; both terms are 
negative for any positive value of ty, so complimentary slackness tells us that the corner 
solution is the answer.  
The intuition for these results is simple; Olson’s asymmetry applies to final goods but not to 
parts. The whole logic of protection in the PFS approach is to transfer income from 24 
 
unorganised interest groups to organised ones. This requires that some of the losers from 
protection are unorganised politically. Tariffs on parts are zero because both parts and final 
good producers are organised, so free trade in parts is best both for social welfare and the 
government. Tariffs on final goods are positive as the losers from tz>0, i.e. consumers, are not 
organised politically.  
4.  UNBUNDLING AND UNILATERAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION: TWO MODELS 
The Cadot, de Melo and Olarreaga (2004) tariff escalation result – which we illustrated in the 
previous section in a simple model – implies that some additional elements must be added to 
the standard lobbying model to account for the observation that so many developing nations 
protected both parts and final goods as part of their infant-industry trade policies. In this 
section, we sketch out two modifications that could account for the initial protection of parts 
and its subsequent removal induced by an unbundling-related shock.  
4.1.  Infant industries and price-lowering protection 
The first model explains the initial protection by introducing a ‘price lowering protection’ 
mechanism. The mechanism is scale economies in a setting where import-substitution polices 
make economic sense.  
 Figure 9: Multiple equilibrium in the parts market with external economies 
This model embraces all the assumptions of the PFS model in Section 3.1 with one exception. 
Parts production is still marked by constant returns at the firm level but now we introduce 













external economies at the industry level. The Y and Z sector technologies are reflected in the 
cost and profit functions Cz[py,z], Cy[y,Y], Πz[pz,py], and Πy[py,Y] where lower-case y and z 
represent firm-level output while their upper-case correspondents represent industry-level 
output. As usual, profits are increasing in own price and decreasing in the price of inputs.  
4.1.1.  Parts protection and multiple political economy equilibriums 
We start from the initial situation where tariffs are zero and domestic parts production is zero. 
We assume that the external economies are such that domestic parts production is 
uncompetitive in this situation. Specifically, marginal costs in Y evaluated at Y=0 exceed 
py
w+τy, where py
w is the world price of y and τy is the frictional trade barrier. Here frictional 
trade barriers is meant to capture all manner of the difficulties involved in buying parts from 
distant suppliers, e.g. coordination costs, problems with unpredictable delivery delays, and 
shipping costs. The situation is shown in  Figure 9 at point E1. 
To consider the political economy around E1, we suppose that the Home Z industry takes this 
situation as given – more precisely, it believes that its actions can only move the equilibrium 
in the neighbourhood of E1. In this case, it will lobby for tariffs in its own sector but against 
tariffs on Y and – as we saw above – the result will be a positive Z tariff, but a zero Y tariff. 
This, however, is not the only conceivable outcome. The presence of external scale effects 
means that protection of domestic parts production may actually lower the domestic price of 
parts.  
If the firm-level marginal cost of production in Y falls initially as industry output expands, it 
is possible that there is a second stable equilibrium, E2, where domestically produced parts 
are cheaper than imports. If the Z sector understands the presence of external economies, they 
would lobby for a prohibitive tariff in parts in order to shift the outcome from E1 to E2. This, 
of course, is just the sort of economic setting in which import-substitution policies make 
sense economically.  
More formally, we characterise the government political economy choice under the two 
outcomes. In the standard PFS set up, the domestic price py varies smoothly with the tariff on 
y, specifically py = py
w+τy+ty. In the current situation, however, there is a discontinuity in the 
formula, py = py
w+τy+ty. When py<py
w+τy, changes in ty have no effect on py. This requires us 
to look directly at the government’s tariff choice. Doing this, the government’s first order 
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In the first situation, E1, dpy/dty=1 and Z firms do not take account of external economies in 
the Y sector. Consequently, the politically optimal Y tariff is zero. In the E2 situation, 
dpy/dty=0 as the government’s choice of Y tariff has no impact on domestic Y prices (i.e. 
there are no imports). What this means is that the first order conditions could be satisfied at 
E1 with ty=0, or at E1 with ty being prohibitive.
14
Notice that even though the domestic price of y is lower at E2 than the trade-cost-laden price 
of imports, Home is not competitive in the world market as it too faces the frictional trade 
cost τy.  
 To select the correct solution, the 
government has to evaluate its objective function at the two points. As Z sector profits rise as 
py falls –and this for level of pz – it is clear that the government would prefer the situation at 
E2 with positive tariffs in Y.  
4.1.2.  The second unbundling and unilateral liberalisation 
As discussed in the introduction, reductions in the cost of organising complex activities at 
distance fostered the unbundling and geographic dispersion of manufacturing production. We 
parsimoniously capture these changes in the model by lowering the frictional trade costs for 
parts, i.e. τy.  
Given the logic supporting the protectionist outcome E2, it is clear that small reductions in τy 
need not have any effect on the equilibrium ty. However once τy falls to the point where parts 
could be bought more cheaply abroad than domestically, the correlation of Y and X sector 
interests disappears and we revert to the Section 3.1 logic where ty=0 while tz>0. For example 
it falls to τ’y as shown in  Figure 9, any tariff on Y will help Y-firms while harming Z-firms. 
As we saw in the initial analysis, this means that the political economy equilibrium reverts 
immediately to free trade in Y.  
This is a story where the underlying shock that fosters international trade in parts also triggers 
a political economy response that results in a complete unilateral liberalisation of tariffs on 
                                                 
14 The assumption that the government imposes a prohibitive tariff on parts is somewhat arbitrary. The idea is 
that in a more fully specified dynamic model, where development of the parts sector took time and the outcome 
was uncertain, a prohibitive tariff on Y gives the greatest incentive to private agents to move to E2.  27 
 
parts. Notice that this story has the tariffs falling suddenly and for all sectors where the 
shipping and/or coordination costs of buying parts and components abroad falls.  
4.2.  The ‘development state’ and offshoring industrialisation 
The PFS model – with its profit-based lobbying – is not the only reasonable model of 
government choices when it comes to trade policy. Many developing nation governments 
seem largely interested in fostering industrialisation per se. A common label for this is the 
“development state” – a term introduced by the political scientist Chalmers Johnson (Johnson 
1982). The second of model linking unbundling to unilateral liberalisation embraces a 
modified version of the PFS model that has strong ‘development state’ features. We assume 
that – as in the PFS model – the government chooses trade policy to maximise a modified 
social welfare function. However the modification involved industrial value added rather than 
industrial operating profits. Specifically: 
  ] [ i i j
d p V aW Ι ∈ Σ + = Ω   (5) 
where Vi is the value added in i at world prices, and i is the set of industrial sectors.
15
To streamline the analysis we work with the economy as described in the previous model, so 









d S p S p p aW + − + = Ω ) ( , where the Si are the supply 
functions of Y and Z. Note that the supply of Z depends upon pz-py while the supply of Y 
depends on py. Before studying the solution to the government’s maximisation problem, note 
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since My=Sz-Sy. In this form, it is clear that the development state has a much greater intrinsic 
interest in limiting the import of parts than does the the PFS government.  
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15 The specification of such government objective functions is necessarily somewhat arbitrary as it is not linked 
to individual optimization. The choice of using industry value added at world prices is directed by 
computational convenience, but the basic results would, I conjecture, go through with an objective function that 
define industry in terms of employment or industrial value added at domestic prices.  28 
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The tariff chosen in Z will be positive for the usual reasons (although likely to be lower than 
in the PFS model as the government cares about value added in Z rather than profits). The 













p p < − ) (  is true. This says that the 
slope of the Y supply curve weighted by world prices exceeds the slope of the Z supply curve 
weighted by the Z sector value added at world prices. We presume that condition holds, so 
ty>0 in the initial equilibrium. 
If the government is a pure development state – i.e. it cares only about industrial value added 
in the sense that the parameter ‘a’ is zero – then both ty and tz will be chosen to be prohibitive. 
The point is easily seen. If a=0, then the derivatives of Ω
d with respect to the tariffs are 
everywhere positive, so raising the tariffs raises the objective function. The connection is 
broken, of course, when all imports cease as at that point tariffs have no further impact on 
domestic prices.  
4.2.1.  Pro-trade FDI and unilateral liberalisation  
Starting from this situation of positive tariffs on parts and final goods, consider the impact of 
production unbundling on tariffs. Specifically, suppose exogenous changes occur (e.g. the 
ICT revolution) that allow the offshoring of Z production by Foreign multinational 
corporations. We assume this is Grossman-Rossi-Hansberg type offshoring where the 
multinational brings superior technology with it and so the host-nation’s comparative 
advantage is shifted. That is, they can now combine their superior Z-sector technology with 
the Home’s low-cost labour by building a factory in Home. In principle this could occur in 
both Z and Y, but in the spirit of international production unbundling, we focus on the case 
                                                 
16 This relies on the fact that dSz/dpy=- dSz/dpz – a result that stems from the input-output linkages assumed. My 
thanks to an anonymous referee for point this out.  29 
 
where it occurs only in Z. This creates a situation where Home becomes part of a Foreign-
firm’s supply chain, importing parts to which it adds value and then exports.
17
This exogenous change opens an alternative route to industrialisation. Instead of using 
barriers to reserve domestic sales for domestic Z-producers, the nation can join an 
international supply chain and produce Z for the wider world market.  
 
If the domestic government does allow the offshoring production to be set up in Home, then 
the nation becomes an exporter of Z in the case we consider. This of course renders its Z 
tariffs useless. More interestingly, it also shifts the endogenous tariff decision in the parts 
sector in a pro-liberalisation direction.  
 
Figure 10: Offshoring and the development state’s tariff choices 
 
                                                 
17 Taking the Y and Z structure literally, this becomes what might be called the ‘China’ case, i.e. where Home is 
the assembly location for final goods that are then mostly sold onward to third nations. Alternatively, we can 
view Y and Z as any two adjacent links in a value added chain in which case it is more natural to view Y as 
parts and Z as components used in the manufacture of some final good not specified. Doing this formally would 
require some modifications to the reasoning as then Z would not be purchased by Home nation consumers, but 





























Recall that pre-offshoring, the government balanced the damage that a marginal Y tariff 
increase did against the value added it created in Y. The marginal damage consisted of the 
usual Harberger Triangles (captured by the negative term atydMy/dpy) plus the marginal 
reduction in Z sector output (captured by the negative term pz
wdSz/dpy). After offshore 
production of Z is established and Home’s supply curve rotates down to the point where it 
becomes an exporter, it is clear that the marginal damage to Z sector value added from any 
marginal rise is the Y tariff becomes greater.  
For example Figure 10 shows the situation where the tariff on parts has not been modified 
after the offshoring of Z production from Foreign to Home has occurred. The question is 
whether this situation is an equilibrium or whether the Home government would find a lower 
ty to be politically optimal after the offshoring. What is clear from the diagram is that any 
change in Z sector technology that allows the nation to become an exporter will involve a 
flatter supply curve in the Z sector. In other words, Z production becomes more sensitive to 
the price of parts and thus the marginal damage from raising ty is higher at any level of ty. By 
inspection of the first order conditions, this tells us that the Home government will find it 
optimal to lower the Y tariff after the offshoring.  
In short, output of the offshored Z factory is more sensitive to parts prices than was the old 
Home Z industry, and this raises the marginal cost of maintaining the same level of ty. In this 
way, the new offshoring factors induce a reduction in domestic tariffs on parts.  
4.2.2.  Race to the bottom unilateralism 
The analysis hereto has presumed that Foreign multinationals have no choice in the location 
of offshored factory. They are either placed in the other nation or stay at home. This affords 
the Home government a free hand in setting its parts tariffs (presuming that the offshoring 
factories remained profitable).  
If we expand the model and allow multiple ‘home’ nations, it is clear that the multinational 
would be in a position to bargain over each nation’s tariff on parts. As every reduction in the 
parts tariff raises its profitability, it would prefer to locate in a nation with a zero parts tariff. 
The game is quite analogous to that played by internationally mobile capital and nations that 
wish to attract it. In the public finance literature, such situations are labelled “race to the 
bottom” as there is a tendency for governments to lower taxes on mobile factors to zero. 
Applying the same logic to the model at hand, we see that there will be a tendency for ‘home’ 31 
 
nations to set their tariffs to zero as a means of attracting offshored factories. Baldwin 
(2006b) calls this “race to the bottom” unilateralism.  
5.  EXTENSIONS OF THE BASIC MODELS 
The two models introduced above lay out basic explanations for why production unbundling 
was associated with unilateral liberalisation. Both fundamentally turn on the reduction in 
frictional barriers to international commerce. The first focuses on the frictional barriers 
(including coordination costs) of trade in parts and components. The second focuses on 
frictional barriers to investment in offshore parts and components production.  
In the first model, the trigger of unilateral liberalisation is the lower of frictional barriers to 
organising production in spatially separated facilities. That is, as the cost of coordinating 
complex activities at distance falls sufficiently, imported parts switch from being more 
expensive than local parts to less expensive. This returns the setting that the standard PFS 
situation where free trade in parts is the political equilibrium. In the second, the trigger is the 
lowering of frictional barriers to what Kojima (1977) called “pro-trade FDI”. Here the shock 
is assumed to affect more than the cost of moving goods across space and coordinating the 
production process in which they are involved. Here the shock also concerns the economic 
feasibility of offshoring production from high-wage-high-technology nations to low-wage-
low-technology nations while still using the high-wage nation’s technology.  
In this section, we consider a number of extensions and combinations of the two fundamental 
political economy mechanisms.  
5.1.  Fragmentation and unilateral liberalisation 
The first extension concerns a pure ‘fragmentation’ mechanism of the type emphases by 
Deardorff (1989a, b), Venables (1999), Kohler (2004a), Rodriguez-Clare (2007), Markusen 
(2006), Antràs et al. (2006), and most recently Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006, 2008). 
In these models, a sector is initially considered as a single good from the point of view of 
trade – and presumably – from the political economy perspective. An exogenous change then 
makes it possible to separate the production stages into two or more segments with trade 
potentially occurring in the sub-product corresponding to the segments.  
In the simplest political economy setting of Section 3.1, such production unbundling will be 
associated with pressures to reduce the tariff on the upstream parts. To see this, note that the 32 
 
pre-unbundling situation would be like Z and Y being merged into one inseparable 
production process. According to the standard Olson’s Asymmetry logic, the government 
would find it politically optimal to protection the combination as the losers of protection are 
not organised while the winners are. Fragmentation would then shift the situation to the one 
modelled in Section 3.1 where we saw that the political optimal tariff on the upstream 
segment, sector Y, is zero. This may help account for the observation that fragmentation is 
often correlated with unilateral trade liberalisation.  
Note that if this occurred, we should observe a densification of the tariff schedule as part of 
the unilateral liberalisation. That is, as the unbundling occurs, we should see nations defining 
their tariff lines more narrowly. In the example at hand, the single tariff line applied to the 
combined Y, Z sector would turn into two tariff lines as part of the effort to protection Z and 
liberalise Y.  
5.2.  Firm-specific parts and components: Export processing 
In the simple models explored in Sections 3 and 4, Y and Z were homogenous goods in the 
spirit of the Walrasian models employed. When it comes to manufacturing, however, this is 
not the only reasonable assumption. For example, seats produced for a particular Toyota 
sedan do not fit into a local made sedan, say Malaysia’s Proton. As it turns out, we can use a 
combination of the models to study this sort of situation.  
To be concrete, consider a three segment supply chain where parts (X) are used in making 
components (Y) which are used in making final goods (Z). Initially, coordination costs are 
such that all production segments are bundled in all nations, and we have some production in 
both Home and Foreign. Furthermore, suppose that Home has poor technology, but 
compensates for this with low wages.  
The shock we focus on is an exogenous change that makes offshoring feasible. Given the 
wage differences, the advanced nation, Foreign, finds is economically advantageous to 
offshoring the production components to Home as this allows the Foreign firm to combine its 
advanced technology with low cost labour. However given the firm-specificity of parts, the 
offshored component factory that is established in Foreign must import all the parts it needs. 
Moreover, since the components are useless to Home producers of Z, all the output of the 
offshored industry is exported. This is outward processing trade. 33 
 
What happens to tariffs in reaction to the offshored factory? The imported parts pose no 
threat to the local parts producers so a tariff would bring no political benefits (apart from the 
tariff revenue) and raising the tariff would actually harm the production of offshored 
components. If the local government cares a lot about industrial jobs and not very much about 
tariff revenue, the politically optimal tariff on Foreign parts is zero. This is true whether the 
local government is interested in promoting local industrial employment, value added or 
profits.  
However, what if it is not possible to define the tariff schedule finely enough to distinguish 
parts destined for the Foreign and domestic component manufacturing? Here the analysis of 
the role of friction barriers helps sort things out. The specificity of parts can be modelled as a 
large frictional ‘barrier’ to using Foreign parts in domestic component-making. The analysis 
in Section 4.1.1 showed that domestic intermediate goods suppliers can be competitive 
locally even when their fundamental costs are higher. In  Figure 9 for example, tariffs are 
necessary to shift the equilibrium from E1 to E2, but once the economy is at E2, the tariff can 
be removed. The frictional barrier separating domestic and Foreign parts is sufficient 
protection to keep the domestic parts competitive in the domestic economy. If we interpret 
the frictional costs as a measure of parts-specificity, we can see that it is possible that a zero 
parts tariff could be politically optimal – even if it is not possible to distinguish between 
domestic and Foreign parts in the tariff schedule. In this situation, the arrival of the offshored 
components factory could provide the spark necessary to lower the parts tariff.  
The basic point is that if the economy starts at E2, removal of the tariff has no impact on 
domestic production and prices as long as the product-specificity-linked frictional barriers 
imply that local parts are cheaper for the local Z producers than imported parts. Tariffs on 
components are irrelevant to the offshored production of components as they are all exported, 
so whatever tariff was optimal previously continues to be after the offshoring.  
5.3.  Switch in government type  
Many accounts of unilateral tariff liberalisation in the international relations literature stress 
the importance of ideas. As the political scientist Razeen Sally puts it: “… practical 
observation teaches us that the prevailing climate of ideas, interacting with interests and 
events, can entrench or sway this-or-that set of policies. A policy consensus on import-
substitution, state planning and foreign aid was strongly embedded in developing-country 34 
 
governments and international organisations up to the 1970s. … This set of ideas was 
overturned by what came to be called the Washington Consensus, which reflected sea-
changes in political ideology and in development economics.” (Sally 2008).  
It is easy to capture such effects by combining our formal models. If a government starts with 
a ‘development state’ objective function as in Section 4.2 but switches to a PFS objective 
function as in Section 3.1, it will find it politically optimal to remove tariffs that it previously 
found optimal to impose. Less radically, the government could start with a development state 
objective function and raise the weight it places on social welfare, i.e. the ‘a’ parameter. 
6.  DUAL TRADE DEVELOPMENT AND THE DEATH OF IMPORT SUBSTITUTION 
The final stylised fact that we wish to address is the fact that import substitution seems to 
have disappeared as a viable development strategy at approximately the same time as the 
second unbundling got going in manufacturing. Here we present the outlines of model that 
suggests the two are related. We consider a model in which production unbundling per se 
renders import substitution policies ineffective. This is relevant to unilateral liberalisation 
since developing countries rather rapid turnaround on the merits of industrial tariffs is very 
much associated with a switch in industrialisation strategy.  
For example, countries in East Asia have long followed a dual-track industrialisation strategy. 
On one hand, they pursued import substitution in an effort to create industries via import 
protection. On the other hand, they encouraged export platforms that employed their workers 
to produce goods for exports – often employed direct or indirectly by multinationals. As the 
1980s and 1990s proceeded, the classic import substitution track failed increasingly while the 
export-oriented track increasingly succeeded.  
The model presented here shows how the offshoring-track renders the import-substitution 
track less viable. The basic story is that the widespread offshoring of labour-intensive tasks 
lowers the marginal cost for Foreign final goods and this makes it harder for the developing 
country to compete in the final good market.  
6.1.  The model 
The basic model is that of Chapter 2.5 in Baldwin et al (2003), which is itself based on the 
‘footloose capital’ model of Rogers and Martin (1995). There are two regions, two sectors, 
and two productive factors. The regions are symmetric in terms of tastes, but may differ in 35 
 
terms of technology and openness to trade. The two sectors are referred to as industry and 
agriculture. Industry is marked by increasing returns, monopolistic competition and iceberg 
trade costs. The agricultural sector is assumed to produce a homogeneous good under 
Walrasian conditions (constant returns and perfect competition) and its output is traded 
costlessly. Assuming that both nations produce some A in equilibrium, this will equalise 
prices and thus indirectly connect wages in the two nations. That is, w*aA*=pA= waA, where 
the w and w* are northern and southern wages (southern variables are indicated with an 
asterisk), and aA* and aA are the respective unit labour input coefficients. With this, we see 
that the high technology nation (south) will have a higher wage measured in units of the 
numeraire, viz. w*/w= aA/aA* >1. 
The productive factors are physical capital K and labour L, with K being international mobile 
while labour is immobile. As capital owners are immobile across regions, physical capital 
moves but all of its reward is repatriated to its country of origin. Worldwide supplies of 
capital and labour are fixed, with the world’s endowment denoted as L
w and K
w.  
Because physical capital can be separated from its owners, the region in which capital’s 
income is spent may differ from the region in which it is employed. We must therefore 
distinguish the share of world capital owned by northern residents (we denote this as 
sK≡K/K
w) from the share of world capital employed
The cost function of a typical industrial firm in the FC model is non-homothetic; that is to say, 
the factor intensity of the fixed cost differs from the factor intensity of the variable cost. To 
keep things simple, we make the extreme assumption that the fixed cost involves only capital 
and the variable cost only involves labour. More specifically, the cost function is:
 in the north. Because each industrial 
variety requires one unit of capital, the share of the world capital stock employed in a region 
exactly equals the region’s share of world industry. Consequently, we can use north’s 
industry share, i.e. sn≡n/(n+n*), to represent the share of capital employed in the north and 
the share of all varieties made in the north.  
x a w m L + π  
where π and wL are the rewards to capital and labour, am is the variable unit input 
requirement, and x is firm-level output.  
The representative consumer in each region has preferences given by: 36 
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where , n
w is the mass (roughly speaking, the number) of industrial varieties available 
worldwide, µ is the expenditure share on industrial varieties, and σ is the constant elasticity 
of substitution between any two varieties. Also, E is northern expenditure, P is perfect price 
index, pA is the price of A, pi is the consumer price of industrial variety i (the variety 
subscript is dropped where clarity permits).  
The last assumption concerns factor migration. Physical capital moves in search of the 
highest nominal reward (i.e. measured in terms of the numeraire) rather than the higher real 
reward (i.e. deflated by a price index) since its income is spent in the owner’s region 
regardless of where the capital is employed.
18
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 Inter-regional factor flows are governed by the 
ad hoc “migration” equation  .  
6.1.1.  The ‘Peripherality Point’  
The location of industry this economic geography model depends upon relative market sizes 
and on the degree of domestic and foreign openness (see Baldwin et al, 2003,Chapter 2.5). 
Here we add a third concern, namely comparative advantage. A convenient way to study the 
interaction of all these forces is to calculate the ‘peripherality point’, i.e. the smallest market 
size that permits the small/poor nation to attract at least some industry.  
To be concrete we consider the north to be the small (poor) nation that is struggling to 
promote industrial development when all industry is initially located in the large (rich) 
south.
19
With this modification, the rewards to capital are:
 To add an important real world element to the equation, we allow for technology 
differences by assuming that the ratio of labour input coefficients differs in the two nations. 
In particular we assume that the north’s ratio aM/aA differs from the south’s aM
*/aA
*, where 
the ai’s are sectoral unit labour requirements using our standard notation.  
20
                                                 





19 In New Economic Geography models, real incomes depend upon industrial location and openness. If both 
countries are equally open, then, as usual, the small country will have less industry and thus a higher price index. 
In other words, the small country will also be the poor country. 
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and χ (a mnemonic for comparative advantage) measures comparative advantage with χ>1 
indicating a comparative advantage for the north in industry; sE is the share of world 
expenditure in the north, and φ is the free-ness of trade, i.e. it equals τ
1-σ where τ is the 
iceberg trade cost. Note that sE, is exogenous as L is immobile and K’s income is repatriated. 
Solving the location condition π=π* for the spatial division of industry, sn, allowing for 
differences in size, openness, and comparative advantage, we have: 
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where, as usual, this is only valid for economically relevant shares; if the right-hand side 
exceeds unity or is less than zero, then sn is one or zero as appropriate.  
Although our expressions are general, we will be particular interested in the case where χ>1, 
i.e. where the small/poor/un-industrialised nation actually has a fundamental comparative 
advantage in industry. The interest lies in the fact that in a neoclassical model, the small north 
would always have some industry regardless of trade costs. In an economic geography model, 
by contrast, market access considerations can allow a pattern of specialisation that contradicts 
comparative advantage. Furthermore, since wages are equalised yet north has a lower labour 
input coefficient in industry, the unit cost of industrial production is lower in the north. 
To find the peripherality point, we view sE as a parameter and search for the sE where sn is 
just equal to zero, i.e. where the core-in-the-south is just barely sustained. Solving sn=0, we 













E s   (10
) 
where sE
P is the peripherality point, i.e. the size of the small northern market that implies it 
has no industry. Since is increasing in sE, we know that north will be without industry (i.e. 
will be the periphery) for any market size that is less than sE
P.  
A particularly salient feature of the peripherality point is that even if the north has a native 
comparative advantage in industry (χ>1) – so that the unit labour cost of producing in north is 
below that of the big south – industry can still be fully concentrated in the south. In other 
words, this is an example of agglomeration producing a trade pattern that contradicts the 
pattern predicted by comparative advantage. 38 
 
The expression for sE
P conveniently organises the various forces that foster industrial 
underdevelopment. By inspection, sE
P is decreasing in χ and in φ*, and increasing in φ. This 
means that the greater is the north’s comparative advantage in manufacturing, the smaller its 
market must be to sustain peripherality. Moreover protection of the big market (the south in 
this case) makes location in the small north less advantageous, so higher big-market 
protection (dφ*<0) allows northern peripherality at a higher northern market size.  
6.2.  Dual track interaction: export promotion extinguishes import 
substitution 
To relate this to the matter at hand, it suffices to note that χ would – in a more complete and 
more complex model with intermediate inputs – depend upon the cost of producing those 
intermediate inputs. If we start from a world where all production is spatially bundled – i.e. 
both nations must produce all their own intermediate inputs – the expression for the 
peripherality point is exact. Now suppose that exogenous changes such as the ICT revolution 
make it feasible to geographically separate the manufacture of some intermediate inputs and 
the higher-technology southern firms can bring their superior technology with them if they 
set up factories in the low-wage north. For the south this would look like the offshoring of 
industrial jobs; for the north it would look like part of their export-oriented development 
strategy. 
The result will be that southern firms will now see the cost of their intermediate inputs fall, 
while the costs facing northern firms are unchanged. In terms of the model, this will raise χ, 
i.e. it will exaggerate the native Ricardian comparative advantage enjoyed by south. Given 
the formula for the equilibrium peripherality point, we see that the offshoring of parts 
production to the north has worsened prospects for the north’s downstream industry. Indeed if 
the shift in χ is large enough, the poor north may see its “infant industry” (the downstream 
industry) completely wiped out. This, of course, is the result we were trying to illustrate.  
6.2.1.  Discussion 
While the model used to illustrate this point is rather special – and indeed not fully worked 
out here – my conjecture is that the basic economic logic is quite robust. Developing nations 
who participate in the global supply chains of advanced nation manufactures of, say, 
automobiles, are indirectly making it harder for their final automobile makers to survive.  39 
 
7.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Unilateral tariff liberalisation by developing nations is a curiously universal phenomenon. 
There has been, however, very little theoretical work to shape our thinking on why this is 
occurring. This paper is an attempt to redress this lacuna by introducing three novel 
mechanisms that could account for unilateral tariff liberalisation by developing nations that 
previously embraced import substitution policies. The particular emphasis is on the role of 
production unbundling as a trigger of this unilateralism. 
One mechanism focuses on the way that reduced frictional barriers to trade in parts and 
components can undermine the correlation of interests between developing country parts 
producers and their downstream customers. A second mechanism focuses on the way that 
Kojima’s pro-trade FDI – a critical component of production unbundling – raise the marginal 
political economy cost of maintain high upstream barriers. The third mechanism works via a 
more general equilibrium channel. The idea is that developing country’s participation in the 
supply chains of advanced-nation industries tends to undermine the developing country’s 
competitiveness in final good production. The eroded final-good competitiveness raises the 
marginal cost of final good protection, so the developing nation government may find it 
politically optimal to marginally lower final good tariffs.  
These economic logics most naturally fit the unilateralism seen in East Asia, Mexico, and 
Central Europe. Unilateral tariff liberalisation, however, is an almost universal phenomenon. 
The autonomous tariff cutting has also occurred in agriculture goods, and a broad range of 
nations as  Table 2 shows. All developing nations ranked among the 50 largest importers in 
the world in 2009 are listed. The first pair of columns shows the bound tariffs – i.e. the tariff 
ceilings they have agreed to as WTO members. The high bound rates typically reflect the 
import substitution tariffs of the 1960s and 1970s which were not negotiated down as 
developing nations did not play reciprocally in the GATT rounds.
21
                                                 
21 Following the logic of the Haberler Report discussed in the introduction, the GATT granted ‘special and 
differential’ treatment to developing nations that allowed them to free ride on the MFN clause during 
multilateral trade negotiations. As a consequence, they did not lower their bound rates. 
 The fact that the applied 
rates (i.e. the tariffs actually charged in 2009) are generally far below the bound rates is a 
good indication of the extent of unilateral tariff cutting. 40 
 
Accounting for this broad set of facts surely requires a combination of mechanisms. The 
novel mechanisms highlighted in this paper, for example, cannot explain tariff cutting in 
agriculture and developing nation not particularly involved in manufacturing. The basic 
Krishna-Mtira story, which suggests that unilateralism is contagious, probably comes in to 
play. Also important in several cases in Africa and in the Indian case was the conditionality 
imposed by the IMF. It would also seem important to consider Ornelas’s approach that 
focuses on the why that selective cutting tariffs raises the variance of the tariff structure and 
with this, the inefficiency of the status quo tariff structure. This in turn could produce new 
political pressures to even out the tariff structure by lower tariffs not directly affected by 
liberalisation mechanism discussed in this paper.  
Table 2: Leading developing importers: Applied and bound tariffs, 2009 
  Agricultural goods  Non-agricultural goods 
   Bound  MFN applied  Bound  MFN applied 
Hong Kong  0  0  0  0 
Iran  n.a.  28.9  n.a.  25.6 
Russia  n.a.  14.2  n.a.  10.2 
Ukraine  11.1  13  5  4.4 
China  15.8  15.6  9.1  8.7 
Chinese Taipei  17.8  16.9  4.8  4.5 
Vietnam  18.5  24.2  10.4  15.7 
Saudi Arabia  20.7  7.1  10.5  4.9 
UAE  25.4  7.1  13.1  4.7 
Singapore  29.1  0.2  6.3  0 
Argentina  32.5  10.3  31.8  11.9 
Philippines  34.7  9.7  23.4  5.7 
Brazil  35.5  10.2  30.8  14.1 
Thailand  42.7  25.2  25.6  8.2 
Mexico  44.2  22.9  34.9  11.1 
Indonesia  47.1  8.5  35.6  6.7 
Venezuela  55.7  16.8  33.6  12.8 
Korea  59.3  49  10.2  6.6 
Turkey  60.1  42.2  16.9  4.8 
Malaysia  83.4  14.7  14.9  8 
Egypt  96.1  66.4  27.7  9.6 
India  114.2  32.2  34.7  10.1 
Source: WTO Tariff Profiles, 2009 (on line database); Russia and Iran were not WTO members in 2009 and so 
have no bound rates. 
This pastiche of mechanisms is a long way from a clear and convincing account of the 
political economy driving the massive, unilateral, and near-universal tariff liberalisation that 
has swept the developing world since the late 1980s. Plainly more theoretical work is need 
and more empirical work is needed to guide it. 41 
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